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Editors: Comments

[VOL. 3.

COMMENTS
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-INJUNCTION
NAME-DETERMINATION

OF AMOUNT

TO PROTECT TRADE

IN CONTROVERSY.

An action brought in a federal court based on diversity of citizenship
must involve an amount in controversy in excess of $3,000, exclusive of
interests and costs, in order to vest the court with jurisdiction.' While
there is little or no difficulty in determining the amount in controversy
in most classes of cases, such a determination is often a perplexing problem
in an action for an injunction.2 While not all injunction suits pose the
problem (for example, it is settled that in a suit brought to enjoin the
collection of a tax, the amount in controversy is the amount of the tax 8),
most do. This Comment will discuss the jurisdictional amount problem
as it arises in one of the kinds of injunction suits giving rise to these
difficulties, viz., a suit wherein the plaintiff seeks an injunction to protect
his trade name. 4 The general rule in cases of this kind appears to be that
the amount in controversy is the value to the plaintiff of the right for
which he seeks protection. 5 The traditional test for ascertaining the value
of the plaintiff's right appears to be that it is equal to the value of the good
will of the business, determined by referring to the dollar volume of the
plaintiff's business or to the amounts spent in advertising. " However,
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1952). The amount was originally set at five hundred
dollars, 1 STAT. 78 (1789); subsequently increased to two thousand dollars, 24 STAT.
552 (1887) ; and finally increased to its present level, 36 STAT. 1091 (1911).
2. See DoME,JurisdictionalAmount in the United States District Court, 38 HARV.
L. REv. 733 (1925). The same material is also printed in DoBiE, HANDBOOK op FEDERAL
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE § 55-59 (1928).

3. See Clark v. Gray, 306 U.S. 583 (1939) ; Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934).
4. What is said below is equally applicable to trademarks not registered under
the federal acts.
5. Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light Heat & Power Co., 239 U.S.
121 (1915) ; Hanson v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 163 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 855 (1948) ; Indian Territory Oil & Gas Co. v. Indian Territory
I. Oil Co., 95 F.2d 711 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 607 (1938); Harvey v.
American Coal Co., 50 F.2d 832 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 669 (1931);
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. A. & P. Radio Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 703
(E.D. Pa. 1937) ; Household Finance Corp. v. Household Finance Corp., 11 F. Supp.
3 (N.D. W.Va. 1935) ; Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 602 (1953). See also DoBiE, op. cit. supra
note 2.
6. See Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline & French Lab., 207 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.
1953) ; Hanson v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 163 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
305 U.S. 607 (1948) ; Indian Territory Oil & Gas Co. v. Indian Territory I. Oil Co.,
95 F.2d 711 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 607 (1938) ; Safeway Stores v. Suburban Foods, 130 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Va. 1955) ; Miles Laboratories v. Seignious, 30 F.
Supp.549 (E.D.S.C. 1939).

(344)
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there is a minority view which holds that, at least in certain kinds of
trade name injunction cases, the test is that the value of the plaintiff's
right is equal to the value of the injury, present and prospective, inflicted
upon the plaintiff's trade name by the defendant's conduct. 7 This Comment will attempt to demonstrate that the traditional test is by far the
better test and should be adopted exclusively.
I.
THE MINORITY TEST.

A recent case which illustrates the application of the minority test,
decided in the eastern district of Pennsylvania and presently being appealed, is Ambassador East v. Orsatti Inc.8 There the owner of a Chicago
restaurant which for about twenty years had used and widely advertised
the name "Pump Room" brought an action to enjoin the defendants from
using that name for a Philadelphia restaurant. The court found that the
decor and general operation of the two restaurants were dissimilar; that
there was no showing of a confusion of the two restaurants in the minds
of people in the Philadelphia area; and that there was no showing that
the defendants' restaurant was of an inferior type, although admittedly
it was of a different type. Relying principally upon Pure Oil Co. v.
Puritan Oil Co.,9 the court dismissed the action, holding: "The injury
present and prospective inflicted upon the plaintiff's trade name 'Pump
Room' by defendants' conduct is the measure of the jurisdictional amount.
Plaintiff has not sustained its burden of proving that the value of
such injury is in excess of $3,000 . ... ,"10

In the Pure Oil case, the plaintiff was a producer, refiner, and distributor of gasoline and other petroleum products doing an extensive business in the mid-west. But its only business in Connecticut, the place of
the defendant's operation, was the sale of industrial oil. The plaintiff
sought to have the defendant enjoined from using the words "Pure" or
"Puritan" in its business of selling gasoline for automobiles. The defendant
operated but one gasoline service station, ninety-five per cent of whose
customers were local residents. The court dismissed the suit on the ground
that the test for the jurisdictional amount is the value of that part of the
plaintiff's good will subject to threat of injury by the defendant's practices
as measured by the value of the injury, and that this test had not been
satisfied.
7. Ambassador East v. Orsatti, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Pa. 1957) ; Food Fair
Stores v. Food Fair, 83 F. Supp. 445 (D. Mass. 1948), af'd, 177 F.2d 177 (lst Cir.
1949); Pure Oil Co. v. Puritan Oil Co., 39 F. Supp. 68 (D. Conn. 1941), rev'd on
other grounds, 127 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1942). Cf. Seagram Distillers Corp. v. New Cut
Rate Liquors, 245 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1957).
8. 155 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
9. 39 F. Supp. 68 (D. Conn. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 127 F.2d 6 (2d
Cir. 1942).
10. 155 F. Supp. at 938.
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These two cases stand for the proposition that the test for the jurisdictional amount is the value of the right the plaintiff seeks to have protected measured by the damage he will suffer if the defendant's conduct
is permitted to continue.
II.
THE TRADITIONAL TEST.

General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen 11 is a trade name injunction case fairly
representative of a line of cases which agree that the test is that the juris-

dictional amount is present only if the value of the right for which the
plaintiff seeks protection is in excess of $3,000, but which disagree as
to how the value of that right is to be determined.' 2 In General Shoe
the court said:
"The amount in controversy is dependent, not upon the damages
-asked or the recovery of profits sought, but upon the value of the
right which the plaintiff seeks to protect, and in this case it is the
value of the good will and business which the plaintiff alleges the
defendant has borrowed and is using for the promotion and sales of
goods of his own make." 13
In Miles Laboratories v. Siegnious,14 a fair trade price enforcement
case, 15 the court said:
"It is a firmly established principle of law that when a litigant
seeks an injunction to protect a right, and shows that some invasion
of that right has occurred or been threatened, the test of the jurisdictional amount is the value of the right that is to be protected and
not the extent of the monetary loss or damage that has been suffered
or is threatened by the invasion."16
These appear to be the only two tests applied by the courts in trade
name injunction cases. It is apparent from a mere statement of each
that what we have termed the minority test is not identical to what we
11. 29 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. W.Va. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 111 F.2d 95
(4th Cir. 1940).
12. Cases cited note 6 supra.
13. 29 F. Supp. at 104.
14. 30 F. Supp. 549 (E.D.S.C. 1939).
15. The jurisdictional amount problem appears to be the same in fair trade price
enforcement cases as it is in trade name injunction suits. In each case the right
for which the plaintiff seeks protection may perhaps be characterized as the intact
value of his good will. The courts themselves seem to feel the problem is at least
similar, since they frequently cite fair trade price enforcement cases in trade name
injunction suits and vice versa. For an example of the former, see Ambassador East
v. Orsatti, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Pa. 1957), and for the latter, the Miles case
itself. In any case, the language above noted is in terms applicable to all injunction suits.
16. 30 F. Supp. at 544.
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have termed the traditional test. The traditional test denies that the value
of the plaintiff's right is to be measured by the value of the injury threatened to it, whereas this is precisely the method of valuation employed by
the minority test. Each of these lines of authority relies upon United
States Supreme Court cases. It thus appears appropriate to examine the
Supreme Court decisions.
III.
THE SUPREME COURT TEST.

Mississippi & Missouri R.R. Co. v. Ward 17 appears to be the first
important injunction case wherein the jurisdictional amount question was
passed upon by the United States Supreme Court. In that case, the defendant erected a bridge across the Mississippi river, thus impeding navigation on the river by the plaintiff, a steamboat owner and operator. In
answer to the defendant's assertion that the amount in controversy did
not exceed $500, the necessary amount at that time,' Mr. Justice Catron
said:
"But the want of a sufficient amount of damage having been
sustained to give the federal courts jurisdiction, will not defeat
the remedy, as the removal of the obstruction is the matter of controversy, and the value of the object must govern." 19
20
In Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light Heat & Power Co.,
wherein the plaintiff sought to have the defendant restrained from maintaining its electric poles and wires on the same side of alleys and streets
as those occupied by the plaintiff's poles and wires, the Court held:

"The district court erred in testing the jurisdiction by the amount
it would cost the defendant to remove its poles.

.

.

. The relief

sought is the protection of that right, now and in the future, and the
value of that protection is determinative of the jurisdiction." 21
In Ward, the Court did not state the method, or even a method, by
which the "'value of the object" was to be determined. Nor did it do so in
Glenwood apropos "the value of that protection." But, in each case the
use of damages as the measure of the jurisdictional amount is specifically
disavowed. While neither of these cases involved a trade name, and thus
17. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 311 (1862).
18. See note 1 supra.
19. 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 314. The quoted language is of little positive help since
there are at least three possible "object[s]" (the bridge, the plaintiff's steamboat business, and the plaintiff's right to be free of the obstruction). See McCoRMICK & CHADBOURN, CASES ON FEDERAL COURTS 214 (2d ed. 1950).
20. 239 U.S. 121 (1915).
21. Id. at 126.
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each is factually distinguishable from cases which do concern trade names,
they are injunction cases, and the language used appears to be broad enough
to include every kind of injunction suit. If the latter proposition be correct, these cases support the traditional test, hereinafter referred to as the
GeneralShoe test.
In 1936 the Supreme Court decided two more cases which are per22
tinent to our inquiry. In McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
the plaintiff brought an action to have an Indiana statute regulating the
purchase of retail sales contracts restrained, asserting that the statute
violated the fourteenth amendment. The plaintiff urged that the jurisdictional amount was to be determined by "the value of the object or [the
right for which protection was sought]." In passing on this point, the
Supreme Court said:
.

. is the right to be

free of [the regulation imposed by the statute].

"The object or the right to be protected .

The value of that

right may be measured by the loss . . . which would follow the
enforcement of the rules prescribed." 23
In KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press,2 4 the plaintiff sought to have

a radio station enjoined from pirating news gathered by the plaintiff for
the use of its members. The Supreme Court, in dismissing the suit for
lack of jurisdiction, said:
"The right for which protection is sought

.

.

.

is the right

to conduct those enterprises free of the alleged unlawful interference
of [KVOS]. No facts are pleaded which tend to show the value
of that right." 2
Three years later, in Gibbs v. Buck,26 a class suit was brought by
several of the members of an unincorporated association, organized to
license the performance for profit of copyrighted music, to restrain the
enforcement of a Florida statute which made such an association unlawful.
The defendant contended that the plaintiff had not shown the requisite
jurisdictional amount, but the Court held otherwise on the ground that the
right of the plaintiff was not threatened with taxation or regulation, but
with prohibition, and that under such circumstances "[T]he issue on
jurisdiction is the value of this right to conduct business free of the prohibition of the statute." 27
Here again, neither of these cases involved a trade name, but each was
an injunction suit, and, at least on the surface, in each case the Court
22. 298 U.S. 178 (1936).
23. Id. at 181.
24. 299 U.S. 269 (1936).
25. Id. at 277.
26. 307 U.S. 66 (1939).
27. Id. at 74.
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valued the plaintiff's right by referring to the threatened monetary loss.
Those cases which adopt the minority test, which will hereinafter be referred
to as the Pure Oil test, interpret these cases as holding that the test by
which the jurisdictional amount is to be measured is the value of the
plaintiff's right as measured by the monetary worth of the injury suffered
or threatened to it.
IV.
MCNUTT,

GIBBS, AND

KVOS

AS INTERPRETED BY THE LOWER

FEDERAL

COURTS.

In a recent fair trade price enforcement case, Seagram Distillers Corp.
v. New Cut Rate Liquors,28 the seventh circuit, on the basis of McNutt,
KVOS and Gibbs, found that there are two classes of diversity cases
which must be distinguished:
"In one class (which we shall call class A) a plaintiff charges
wrongful acts by a defendant . . . which have, or will, injure a
right for which plaintiff seeks protection. In such a case, if plaintiff
shows that the alleged injury or damage " caused or threatened by a
defendant, . . . amounts to at least $3,000, the federal court has

jurisdiction.
In the other class of diversity cases (which we shall call class B),
a plaintiff charges wrongful acts by a defendant .

.

. which, if not

prevented, will completely deny or destroy the right for which plaintiff seeks protection. In such a case, if plaintiff shows that the right
is worth at least $3,000, the federal court has jurisdiction." 30
The authorities relied upon in Pure Oil were McNutt and KVOS. 81
In Orsatti, the court relied principally on Pure Oil, but also referred,
inter alia, 2 to Seagram, apparently finding that Orsatti was a Seagram
It thus appears that the fountainheads of the Pure Oil
class A case.8
rule are McNutt and KVOS.
KVOS cites no authority for its holding on the jurisdictional amount
question. In McNutt, cases are cited which invoke the principle that
jurisdiction is to be tested by the value of the object or right to be protected
28. 245 F.2d 453 (7th Cir.-1957).
29. Emphasis by the court.
30. 245 F.2d at 455.
31. This reference is in the additional opinion, beginning at 39 F. Supp. 938.
32. 155 F. Supp. at 938. In sum, the court cites four cases: Pure Oil; Seagram;
Food Fair Stores v. Food Fair, 83 F. Supp. 445 (D. Mass. 1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d
177 (1st Cir. 1949) which relied upon Pure Oil; and Draper v. Skerret, 116 Fed. 206
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1902), a trade name injunction case more frequently ignored than
cited in which the court used the measure of damage as the test-but to find jurisdiction, not to deny it.
33. But see Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Winkenweder & Ladd, Inc., 250 F.2d 154
(7th Cir. 1957), wherein the same court which decided Seagram apparently held
that trade name injunction cases are Seagram class B cases.
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against interference, but no cases are cited for the Court's statement that
"the value of the right may be measured by the loss, if any, which would
follow enforcement of the rules prescribed."
While there are cases in addition to Pure Oil and Orsatti which
similarly interpret McNutt and KVOS,34 there are also cases which do

not. 35 General Shoe itself'was decided after McNutt and KVOS. While
neither the General Shoe district court decision nor the circuit court decision (which reversed the case on other grounds) mentions either McNutt
or KVOS, the court in a subsequent trade name injunction case from
the same circuit, Safeway Stores v. Suburban Stores,36 in rejecting the
assertion of the defendant therein that the McNutt rule should apply, said:
"The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has expressly held
that in a suit of this kind, the value of the good will is the amount
in controversy.

General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen. .

.

. The briefs in

that case disclose that the point was raised and fully argued ....
Defendant argues that the amount in controversy is the amount of
damage done, or apprehended to, the good will, citing McNutt . .
and KVOS.

.

.

. But with both of these cases in mind the Court

of Appeals decided General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, supra, conclusively
demonstrating the inappositeness here of McNutt and KVOS." 8T
McNutt and KVOS were also distinguished in Caron Corp. v. Wolf
Drug Co., a fair trade price enforcement case, the court there saying:
"Neither case had-to do with the sale of identified commodities and
price restrictions as an appropriate means of protecting good will, they
are distinguishable." 8
Furthermore, there are cases wherein the General Shoe rule is applied with no mention of McNutt or KVOS or. of the
rule thereof as enunciated in Pure Oil.39
On the other hand, in a very recent Hawaiian district court fair trade
price enforcement case, Sunbeam Corp. v. Gem Jewelry Co.,4 0 the court
expressed doubt as to the validity of the General Shoe rule to fair trade
cases (and thus impliedly to trade name injunction cases) 41 in the light
of Seagram and KVOS.
34. See, e.g., Food Fair Stores v. Food Fair, 83 F. Supp. 445 (D. Mass. 1948),
aff'd, 177 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1949) ; Dixie Greyhound Lines v. Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 953
(W.D. Ky. 1942).
35. See, e.g., Caron Corp. v. Wolf Drug Co., 40 F. Supp. 103 (D.N.J. 1941). See
also Safeway Stores v. Suburban Foods, 130 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Va. 1955).
36. 130 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Va. 1955).
37. Id. at 252.
38. 40 F. Supp. 103, 105 (D.N.J. 1941).
39. See, e.g., Remington Arms v. Gatling, 128 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Pa. 1955);
General Electric Co. v. Sabreen, 128 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. Pa. 1953); Jewel Tea Co.
v. Krause, 88 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Ill. 1950), modified, 187 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1951).
40. 157 F. Supp. 838 (D. Hawaii 1957). The case is interesting on another point
also, viz., it held the Hawaiian. fair trade act invalid because in conflict with the
Sherman Act.
41. See note 15 supra.
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It thus appears that there is a conflict among the lower federal courts
as to the proper interpretation to be given to McNutt and KVOS. This
writer feels that the Pure Oil cases have misconstrued the test used in
McNutt and KVOS, and that, in any case, the test used there has no application to a trade name injunction suit. If this proposition be correct, the
Pure Oil rule must stand or fall on its reasoning, not authority.
In McNutt, the plaintiff put in evidence the net worth of the business.
But, the net worth of the business was not the right for which protection
was sought. The plaintiff sought protection only for what was threatened
with injury, viz., that part of the business which would be closed to it if it
were forced to comply with the statute. As to this right, no evidence at all
was presented. "They [plaintiff's allegations] fail to set forth any facts
showing what, if any, curtailment of business and consequent loss the enforcement of the statute would involve." 42 In fact then, the case was dismissed because the plaintiff had proved no right, not an insufficiently valuable right. But, even assuming that the Court meant to hold that in the
case there at bar, the only proper test was the value of the harm threatened,
this does not necessarily apply to all injunction cases. The value of the
plaintiff's right to conduct its business without the restrictions imposed by
the statute was equivalent to the value of the injury which would be caused
by compliance. However, a test imposed in a case where the value of the
plaintiff's right is equal to the value of the injury complained of is not
applicable to a trade name injunction case in which the value to the plaintiff
of his right to the exclusive use of a trade name has no necessary connection to the value of the complained-of infringing use.4
Moreover, McNutt was a case wherein the enforcement of a state
statute was sought to be enjoined on the ground that it contravened both
the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Such a suit involves policy considerations obviously not found
in a trade name injunction suit involving private parties only. Since a
federal court is reluctant to enjoin the operation of a state statute,4 4 and
since it is also reluctant to reach a constitutional question if it can be
avoided,4 it is likely to be far more restrictive in its treatment of the
jurisdictional issues than it would be in a case wherein those factors are
absent. For this reason also, McNutt seems inapplicable to a trade name
injunction suit.
A close reading of KVOS suggests that here also the Court found
jurisdiction lacking not because the plaintiff had not shown injury to his
42. 298 U.S. at 181.
43. See DowIt, op. cit. supra note 2 at § 56.
44. "Caution and reluctance there must be in special measure where relief if
'granted is an interference by the process of injunction of state officers discharging
in good faith their supposed official duties." Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52, 60 (1933).
45. "It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature
unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case." Burton v. United States, 196 U.S.
283, 295 (1905); see also Mr. Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936).
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right causing damage in excess of three thousand dollars, but because the
plaintiff did not show any right which was being injured. It does not
appear that the Court insisted that the plaintiff show damage in excess
of three thousand dollars. The Court's discussion of the amount of damages shown by the plaintiff is explainable as a reference to the existence
(or rather, non-existence) of a right, and not as the necessary method of
measuring the value of that right.
Of course, there remains the factual- distinction-neither McNutt nor
KVOS was a trade name injunction action.
It is suggested that these cases are best interpreted as in conformity
with Ward and Glenwood. The test for the jurisdictional amount is always
the value of the right for which the plaintiff seeks protection. While in
some cases the right may be valued by ascertaining the value of the
threatened injury--only cases in which the injury encompasses the whole
scope of the right-it is not necessarily always to be so measured.
Before examining the reasoning given to support the Pure Oil rule
and contrasting it with its counterpart for the General Shoe rule, doubtless
a necessary preliminary step is to determine if there exists a factual distinction between the two lines of cases. In Pure Oil and in Orsatti, much
stress is placed upon the fact that the plaintiff does not do a substantial
amount of business within the territorial area in which the defendant operates. But, this is not the fact setting in every case which applied the
Pure Oil rule,46 although there is at least one such case which applied the
General Shoe rule. 47 This appears to be the only factual difference which
might be found to be material. It is submitted that this distinction is
immaterial. Whether or not the plaintiff does a substantial amount of
business in the locale of the defendant's operation would appear to pertain
to the existence of a right, not to its value. How a person acquires a right
to the protection of his trade name is, of course, a matter of substantive law.
While it is not within the scope of this Comment to discuss the substantive
law of trade names, it is noted here that, in general, a person has such
48
If
a right only if he can establish a secondary meaning in the name.
he does no business in the defendant's locale, there is at least the possibility that he has no secondary meaning subject to injury there, and so
no right. But, if he has the right there, it would seem that he has it regardless of the extent of his operation.
In Pure Oil, in what appears to be the only judicial expression of the
reason for the rule, the court said:
"To measure the amount in controversy by reference to the value
of certain property, irrespective of the extent of injury to it, would be
46. See Dixie Greyhound Lines v. Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Ky. 1942).
47. Safeway Stores v. Suburban Foods, 130 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Va. 1955).
48. A trade name has acquired a secondary meaning when "a substantial number of present or prospective purchasers understand the designation, when used in
connection with goods, services or a business, . . . as referring to a particular person
or association." RESTATm NT, TORTS § 716, comment b at 560 (1950). See Maison
Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Cafe, 159 Misc. 551, 288 N.Y.S. 529 (Sup. Ct.
1936).
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entirely arbitrary and inconsistent with the general principle by which
the amount in controversy is defined as 'the value of the object to be
gained' by the action." 49

On the other hand, the cases which apply the General Shoe rule seem
to reason that a certain amount of good will attaches to a trade name
and that the value of the plaintiff's right is the value of this good will,
usually measured by the amount spent in establishing the trade name as
such or by referring to the dollar volume of the business.50
In a trade name injunction suit, the right for which the plaintiff seeks
protection is the exclusive use of a particular name for a given business. 51
It is suggested that the value of that exclusive use bears no necessary
relationship to injuries done to it. The "object to be gained" by such a
suit is the maintenance of the element of exclusiveness in the trade name,
which means the right to create and maintain a business reputation without
the interference of third parties.5 2 Doubtless, the actual value of a trade
name exclusively one's own is a nebulous thing and varies with the name
and circumstances. However, it seems wholly reasonable to assume, that
when a plaintiff can show that he has spent great sums of money to advertise his name and that he does a substantial volume of business using that
name, a not insignificant portion of that business' value can be attributed
53

to the name itself.

In both Orsatti and Pure Oil the extent of the injury shown appears
to be so slight as to be almost de minimis.5 4 Were there in fact no.injury,
49. 39 F. Supp. at 71.
50. See Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline & French Lab., 207 F.2d 190 (9th
Cir. 1953) ; Hanson v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 163 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 855 (1948) ; Indian Territory Oil & Gas Co. v. Indian Territory
I. Oil Co., 95 F.2d 711 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 607 (1938); Del Monte
Special Food Co. v. California Packing Corp., 34 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1929) ; Jewel Tea
Co. v. Krause, 88 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Ill. 1950), modified, 187 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.
1951); Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 602 (1953).
51. "It is the good will-the right to the exclusive use of the name-which is
endangered, and the bare statement of the facts conclusively indicates a value many
times larger than the jurisdictional amount." Harvey v. American Coal Co., 50 F.2d
832, 834 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 669 (1931) (use of the name "Pocahontas"
in the sale of coal).
52. "His mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear
it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the owner's
reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his own control. This is an injury, even
though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and another can use it
only as a mask. And so it has come to be recognized that, unless the borrower's use
is so foreign to the owner's as to insure against any identification of the two, it
is unlawful." Per Judge Learned Hand, Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972,
974 (2d Cir. 1928).
53. See cases cited supra note 6. But see Sunbeam Corp. v. Gem Jewelry Co.,
157 F. Supp. 838, 839 (D. Hawaii 1957), wherein the court said: "[I]f it happens
to be a plaintiff corporation that is nationally well-known [the bulk of the fair trade
cases] simply say that obviously the good will of the corporation is in excess of $3,000
and go merrily on from that point. There are apparently no cases involving unpopular
corporations or corporations that have unpopular products and hence no good will of
the value of $3,000."
54. In Pure Oil only five per cent of the defendant's customers were non-local
residents and there was no showing that any of these five per cent or of the other
ninety-five per cent had been, were or might become customers of the plaintiff. In
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then there would have been no right requiring protection. But on the facts
of the cases as reported, it is submitted that neither should have been
dismissed for lack of jurisdictional amount. A further consideration of
Orsatti and Pure Oil suggests a final reason for rejecting the test there
applied. To value the plaintiff's right by ascertaining the amount of damages suffered or threatened is, if not a decision on the merits, at least an
extensive consideration of them. This would seem to be putting the cart
before the horse. Moreover, consider the wasted time of a court with a
crowded docket should it eventually be found that jurisdiction is lacking.
IV.
CONCLUSION.

To conclude, it is suggested that the General Shoe rule is the better
of the two, and is wholly acceptable in its own right. Ample precedent
establishes that the test is properly framed in terms of "the value of the
right the plaintiff seeks to have protected", and those cases which have
been held to have asserted a different test either do not do so in fact
or at least are distinguishable. In a trade name injunction case, the value
of the plaintiff's right, since it has no necessary correlation with the value
of the threatened injury to it, should be determined without reference to
the value of the threatened injury, and this is so without regard to the
extent of the business engaged in by the plaintiff in the area in which
the defendant operates. It appears improper to equate the value of a right
with the value of a limitation on that right, which is the effect of the Pure
Oil rule. Since a trade name is intangible and since trade names alone
are not bought and sold, an accurate determination of their value appears
to be impossible. Yet certainly a trade name can be quite valuable. 55 Some
standard must be used; 5 the General Shoe rule seems to be the best one
possible.
Joseph M. Smith.
Orsatti, the court said: "The only evidence offered by plaintiff suggesting that the
defendant could possibly be inflicting any injury, present or prospective, on plaintiff's
trade name, was that in the last five years over 600 Philadelphians had stayed at their
hotels ....
There was no showing that these particular people had ever been to either
the plaintiff's Pump Room or Orsatti's Pump Room, nor was there any evidence
of confusion of the two restaurants in anyone's mind." 155 F. Supp. at 939.
55. See CALLMAN, TH LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 65.3
(2d ed. 1950), for a discussion of the business value of a trade name. The amount of
advertising of trade names in the United States today is itself evidence from which one
is forced to conclude that it is at least possible for a trade name to be valuable, and
strongly suggests that the possibility is frequently a reality.

56. It may be argued that there is no real importance to the problem herein discussed since resort may always be had to the state court. This is true in a sense,
since the substantive law to be applied will be the same whether the suit is brought
in a federal or a state court. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938);
Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1943). But if the plaintiff
has a right to a federal forum and he wishes to assert it, it ought not to be denied
him. Moreover, there are sound practical reasons why he might prefer the federal
court: less technical pleading and procedure; more liberal discovery rules; obviation
of possible prejudice on the part of a local forum in favor of the resident defendant;
and, most important, the greater familiarity of the federal court with the law of
unfair competition of which trade name injunction cases are a part, due to their experiences with this body of law in trade mark, patents, and copyrights cases.
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PATENTS-CONTRIUTORY
§ 271 AND How IT HAS

INFRINGEMENT

AND

MISUSE-35

U.S.C.

GROWN-RECENT CASE AND COMMENT.

Some five years have passed since the Congress made its first excursion into the field of contributory infringement.' As will be set out briefly
below, 2 the courts had earlier composed this tune of liability in the key of
broad patent policy with the classical theme of joint tortfeasance in mind.
Soon, to please the ear of a critical public, the counterpoint of "misuse"
was copied from the old air, "unclean hands." The conductor's handling.
of the melodies left the musician-patentee reluctant to play before the public.
Sympathetic Congress sought to produce a new arrangement for the
patentee or, as some say, at least convince him that the present one would
still woo infringing vermin from Hamelin. 3
In the following paragraphs, after a recital of the material background,
it is proposed to set out what the next interpreters of patent law "music"
have said or left unspoken regarding the "new" tune. The pertinent pronouncements of the courts since the enactment of section 271 of the Patent
Act of 1952 will be examined with the emphasis on contributory infringement and misuse. It is also proposed to divine some pattern of development
in these pronouncements with the aid of comment from the academy and
the patent bar.
I.
A

BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF THE DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
AND THE DEFENSE OF MISUSE OF THE
PATENT MONOPOLY.

A. Before Mercoid.
Chief Justice Taney had announced in Prouty v. Ruggles 4 that one

who used less than all the elements of a patented combination to achieve
the same result did not infringe the patent.5 A clever rogue seized upon
this in hopes of avoiding the patent on a coal oil lamp. He manufactured
the lamp without the chimney and became the defendant in Wallace v.
Holmes." To that case are traced the beginnings of the doctrine of contributory infringement. On an inference from the facts the court there
found that the defendant -acted in concert with the makers of the other

element to the end of infringing the plaintiff's patent, and that he was liable
1. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), (c), (d) (1952) and see 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NZws
2394, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
2. See text at n. 4-19 infra.
3. See note 1 supra. See also Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the
Patent Act of 1952, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 476 (1953) ; Rich, Contributory Infringement, 31 J. PAT. OFF Soc'y 449 (1949); Turner, Contritntory Infringement, 39 J.
PAT. Ovr. Soc'Y 239 (1957) ; Note, 66 HAiw. L. Rzv. 909 (1953).
4. 4i U.S. (16 Pet.) 336 (Jan. Term 1842).
5. Id. at 341.
6. 29 Fed. Cas. 74, No. 17,100 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
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as an infringer. He was treated as a joint tortfeasor; the burner was the
"heart of the invention" and the defendant appropriated it for his own
profit in a manner inconsistent with the constitutionally proclaimed policy
of patent protection.7
Fifteen years of building upon Wallace were marked in Snyder v.
Bunnell s in which one who sold an "automatic drop" capable of use in the
plaintiff's "electro-magnetic burglar-alarm apparatus" was not considered
an infringer. But the "automatic drop" was capable too of innocent employment apart from the patented combination, a fact negating the inference of
an intent to cooperate in the infringement. It was noted that the success
of the plaintiff in these cases was always based on the inference of such
an intent from the fact that the article emitted by the defendant was usable
only in the patented application.9
In the Button-Fastener"I case, Judge Lurton, then in the sixth circuit
began a new application of the doctrine of contributory infringement.
Patented machines were sold to shoe manufacturers on the condition that
the vendees purchase the unpatented wire staples used in the machines
exclusively from the vendor-company. The court upheld the company's
claim against one who manufactured similar staples for unauthorized use
in the company's machines. This unauthorized use was the infringement
to which the defendant contributed. It could still be argued that the staples
were limited to use in the plaintiff's machines because of the peculiar
dimensions of the raceway in those machines, but with the appearance of
securing a monopoly upon an unpatented article quite apart from the
patent grant, the doctrine took on a rather frightening obliquity,'
7. The often quoted clause, U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8: "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries," adopted
unanimously by the Convention upon the motions of delegates Madison and Pinckney.
8. 29 Fed. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1886).
9. This decision was preceded by the case of Saxe v. Hammond, 21 Fed. Cas.
593, No. 12,411 (C.C.D. Mass. 1875) in which the reliance of Wallace v. Holmes,
29 Fed. Cas. 74, No. 17,100 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871), upon a "certain inference" of intent
to infringe was pointed up tegether with the negation of such an inference from
the facts in Saxe v. Hammond, supra. The defendant in the latter case manufactured
a fan which might be used in the plaintiff's patented tremolo attachment for organs,
but this was not proved the sole possible use. See also Rumford Chemical Works v.
Hecker, 20 Fed. Cas. 1342, No. 12,133 (C.C.D. N.J. 1876) (defendant made "selfraising flour" containing elements necessary to plaintiff's process; inference was made
of an intent that heat and water would be added to complete the infringement);
Millner v. Schofield, 17 Fed. Cas. 392, No. 9609a (C.C.W.D. Va. 1881) (even if
defendant intentionally sold stovemaking supplies for uses in constructing the
patentee's complicated tobacco curer, protection of invention cannot be carried to
parts useful otherwise than in the invention).
10. Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288
(6th Cir. 1896).
11. Only two years had passed since Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated
Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894). In that case the defendant sold oval
rolls of toilet paper fitted for use in the plaintiff's patented fixtures. After remarking on the invalidity of a patent on the rolls,' the Court declared the inapplicability
of the doctrine of contributory infringement to the sale of an unpatentable article,
perishable in nature, which it was the object of the machine to deliver and which
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While the matter stood thus, another sixth circuit decision pointed
out the limitation of liability under the doctrine to cases in which there
had been an infringement completed in this country. 12 The second circuit
noted, significantly, that if the article involved were a staple article of
commerce, application of the doctrine would work too great a burden upon
trade. 13 Justice McKenna in Leeds & Catlin v. Victor Talking Mach. Co.'"
declared that sound disc records were an essential, albeit unpatented,
element of the plaintiff's "talking machine," and there was contributory
infringement in the defendant's manufacture and sale of the record discs
which at the time the case arose had no use apart from the plaintiff's machine. For this reason the case is not as "pro-monopoly" as ButtonFastener appears to be. The records were found to be of sufficient permanance to rule out the argument of a privilege to replace and repair parts.
Development from the Button-Fastener case was finally arrested some
twenty-one years after that decision.'6 The distributor of the only successful motion picture projector of that day sold the instrument on condition that it be used only to exhibit films procured from the distributor.
The restriction was required by the distributor's agreement with the patent
must be replenished in use. While this dictum became important, it appears that
there was no direct infringement in the case to which contribution could be made.
As Judge Rich says: "Contributory infringement within its proper bounds has
always, by its very nature, given protection to something not strictly within the
claims, and in that sense unpatented." Rich, Contributory Infringement Under Section
271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 J. PAT. OFP. Soc'y 476 at-486 (1953). Yet previous
developments had indicated that if not strictly within the patent claims, the protected
"something" must be useless apart from the claimed invention. See Morgan Envelope
Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co. and notes 6, 8, and 9 supra.
If the Button-Fastener case did not take contributory infringement across a line,
neither did it keep the doctrine within its proper bounds-at least as previously defined
-but served to blur the boundary running through the case, See Rich, supra.
12. Bullock Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 129 Fed. 105
(6th Cir. 1904). However, the delicacy of a defense on this ground was shown in
Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 90 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1937) (defendant's
momentary insertion of tubes for testing before export completed the patented circuit
and thus the infringement). See also Sutton v. Gulf Smokeless Coal Co., 77 F.2d
439 (4th Cir. 1935). It is submitted that this principle has been unaffected by later
cases or statutes.
13. Cortelyou v. Charles E. Johnson & Co., 145 Fed. 933 (2d Cir. 1906). This
case distinguished the Button-Fastener case on its facts. See notes 9 and 11 supra.
14. 213 U.S. 325 (1909).
15. This development had crystallized in the decision, Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.,
224 U.S. 1 (1912). Again Justice Lurton, now on the Supreme Court bench, delivered the opinion. First finding federal jurisdiction under the patent law, the majority
then upheld a "license plate" agreement which imposed upon buyers of a mimeograph
machine the obligation to purchase supplies from the vendor-patentee. The defendant's
sale of ink which had its "most conspicuous use" (rather than "only use") in the
plaintiff's machine was deemed to be contributory infringement.
The minority opinion stressed the invasion of states' rights in assuming jurisdiction over a matter of pure contract law. The dissenters apparently overlooked the
importance of the liberalization of the basis for an inference of intent to contribute
to infringement and any question as to the status of the ink as an ordinary and
.staple article of commerce. Of course the consideration last mentioned had not yet
assumed independent importance in the decision of these cases. Compare Duplex
Envelope Co. v. Denominational Envelope Co., 80 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1905) (no
inference or imputation of intent found, and article was in ordinary commerce) with
Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., snpra.
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owner. This condition was set out on plates attached to the machine; it
was urged that use in violation of this condition infringed the patent. The
Court in the Motion Picture1 case noted the statement of anti-monopolistic
policy in the Clayton Act,' 7 declared the license plate conditions a matter
of "general law" rather than a patent matter, and held the defendant free

of any wrong under the patent law in selling its own films to owners of the
plaintiff's machines.
Following this disposition of the point, the doctrine rested quietly until
1931. In that year, Justice Brandeis, after a knowledgeable review of the
cases, pronounced the judgment of the Court in the Carbice-1 case. The
plaintiff there was denied the right to maintain an action to preserve control of the sale of solid carbon dioxide to users of a patented shipping
package. A patent could not be used to secure even a limited monopoly
outside of the patent grant. The defense, "misuse of the patent monopoly,"
once a rumbling in the orchestra pit became an ordered and audible
crescendo.' 9
B. Mercoid and Thereafter.
Accompanying the rising sound of "misuse" came a diminuendo for
contributory negligence that is rivalled only in the Ouverture Solennelle.
The music ended in irritating cacophony with the Mercoid 20 decisions.
16. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)
(Holmes, McKenna and Van Devanter, JJ., dissented).
17. 38 S'rA'r. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952). See Oppenheim, Patents and
Antitrust: Peaceful Coexistence?, 54 MIcH. L. Rxv. 199 (1955).
18. Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patent Development Corp., 283 U.S.
27 (1931).
19. In Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938) Justice Brandeis
relied on Carbice, but again a staple (bituminous emulsion, or asphalt) was the
material over which control was sought. Unfortunately broad and unwarranted
language was used to describe the Carbice case: "By the rule declared, every use of
a patent as a means of obtaining a limited monopoly of unpatented material is prohibited." Id. at 463. The "unpatented material" involved was, after all, frozen carbon
dioxide, a staple article of commerce as stated in the opinion itself. See note 11
supra. (Staples never within the classical concept of contributory infringement.)
The circuit courts took up the theme in American Lecithin Co. v. Warfield Co.,
105 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1939) and J. C. Ferguson Mfg. Works v. American Lecithin
Co., 94 F.2d 729 (1st Cir. 1938). A staple was again involved, but it now became
clear that the plaintiff's own acts could be self-defeating, in spite of a showing of
the defendant's infringing intent or actual infringement.
The penultimate bar of this movement was played in the companion cases of B. B.
Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942) and Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger
Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). In the latter case, the self-defeating nature of the plaintiff's misuse, without antitrust violation and without injury to the defendant, became
clearer still. Of course salt, the material there in question, is and has been a staple.
But in the former case the material was a pre-coated and pre-slit fabric necessary
to the plaintiff's patented process in shoemaking and apparently peculiar to it. Since
the two cases were decided together, some notion of judicial momentum may explain
the similarity of holdings in the face of seemingly significant variations in the facts,
but the B. B. Chemical case is arguably merely another reversal of the ButtonFastener trend. See note 15 supra.
20. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) and Mercoid
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
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Mid-Continent Investment Co. was assignee of a heating system patent,
and Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. had an exclusive license upon
the patent. Under this license royalties were based on sales of a combustion stoker switch, or holdfire control, to be used as an element of the combination. Neither company constructed the system, but Minneapolis sold
the switch giving the purchaser the right to make one installation under the
patent. Mercoid made switches usable in the patented combination. MidContinent had previously had judgment against one Smith who constructed
its patented combination using Mercoid's switches. 21 Mercoid defended
that suit. Mid-Continent then brought suit against Mercoid for contributory
infringement. Mercoid pleaded misuse and filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment and treble damages alleging a conspiracy between MidContinent and Minneapolis to establish an illegal monopoly; Minneapolis
was made a party plaintiff and involuntarily appeared. Mercoid also
brought a separate action for declaratory judgment and treble damages
against Minneapolis.
In Mid-Continent's suit the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois found that the plaintiff had notice of prototypes
of the controls in question developed substantially before the issue of its
patents. Deciding for the defendant, that court enjoined Mid-Continent
from further suit because of laches, but treble damages on the counterclaim
were denied.2 2 The action instituted by Mercoid was dismissed along
with a suit by Minneapolis which had been consolidated with it and in
which Mercoid had also filed a counterclaim. 23
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
the decision for Mercoid in the Mid-Continent suit, saying that there was
no other use for the devices but in the plaintiffs' combination. While
Mercoid had a right to produce its patented controls, it could not do so
for any purpose. Mercoid could not extend its monopoly to invade that
24
of the plaintiff any more than Mid-Continent could invade Mercoid's rights.
In the Minneapolis suit, the circuit court reversed the dismissal of Minneapolis' complaint 2 21. Smith v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 106 F. 2d 622 (8th Cir. 1939) (affirming the
district court). It was with reference to this decision that the issue of res judicata
was raised in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); case
notes primarily concerned with this aspect of the litigation appear at 57 HARv. L.
Rmv. 574 (1944) and 92 U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1944).
22. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. v. Mercoid Corp., 43 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1942)
(furthermore, the court apparently concluded that there was no intent to provide the
means to infringe the patent).
23. Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 43 F. Supp. 878
(N.D. Ill.1942), 46 F. Supp. 675 (N.D. Ill. 1942) (final decree). In these cases
a different patent was in suit; it was declared valid, contributorily infringed, and
misused.
24. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. v. Mercoid Corp., 133 F.2d 803 (7th Cir. 1942)
(contributory infringement).
25. Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 133 F.2d 811 (7th
Cir. 1942).
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Insofar as they throw light upon the relationship between the doctrine
and the defense under discussion, the opinions rendered in the Supreme
Court are remarkable in judicial history. They demonstrate an unparalleled and a pronouncedly inefficient incandescence.26 Assuming that
Mercoid did not act in innocence, the plurality opinion in the Mid-Continent
suit nonetheless felt Leeds to be inconsistent with the view adopted from
the dicta in Carbice and the cases which came after it. The action of the
plaintiffs amounted to misuse, barring their remedy against either a direct
27
or a contributory infringer.
"The result of this decision, together with those which have preceded
it, is to limit substantially the doctrine of contributory infringement.
What residium may be left we need not stop to consider. It is sufficient
to say that in whatever posture the issue may be tendered the courts
of equity will withhold relief where the patentee and those claiming
under him are using the patent privilege contrary to the public interest." 28
Putting aside the term "privilege," 29 it is difficult to conceive of any
posture in which the patentee would be suing for contributory infringement
and yet not thus be trying to exercise some control over something not
strictly within the patent grant. But if the thing is not within the patent
claims then it is within the Carbice-Mercoidprohibition:
"That result may not be obviated in the present case by calling
the combustion stoker switch the 'heart of the invention' or the 'advance in the art.' The patent is for a combination only. Since none
of the separate elements is claimed as the invention, none of them when
dealt with separately is protected by the patent monopoly." ao
The remarks and implications in the decision need only be applied to the
cases discussed above to indicate the consternation and other reactions at
the patent bar and in the academy. 3 '
26. The Court was very badly divided in deciding the two cases. For a suggestion of the many confusing possibilities generated by these opinions, see Wood, The
Tangle of Mercoid Case Implications, 13 Gao. WASH. L. Rev. 61 (1944).
27. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (semble).
28. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 669 (1944). See Rich,
Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
476, 486 (1953) and Matthews, Contributory Infringement and the Mercoid Case,
27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 260 (1945).
29. On this characterization of the patent interest, compare: Rich, Stuff and
Nonsense in the Government's Mercoid Brief, 27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 331 (1945) with
27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 150 (1945) (reprint of Government brief in Mercoid as
amicus curiae).
30. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 667 (1944). But see
Leeds & Catlin v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 325 (1909) and Wallace v.
Holmes, 29 Fed. Cas. 74, No. 17,000 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
31. A perusal of statements in the cases would further demonstrate this. E.g.,
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950) (discussion of cases and application of the Mercoid holding) ; Transparent-Wrap Mach.
Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947) (permissible to require assign-
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35 U.S.C. §271

AND THEREAFTER.

Congress was not callous to the plight of the confused, on or off the
bench:
"The doctrine of contributory infringement has been a part of
our law for about 80 years. It has been applied to enjoin those who
sought to cause infringement by supplying someone else with the
means and directions for infringing a patent. One who makes a
special device constituting the heart of a patented machine and supplies it to others with directions (specific or implied) to complete
the machine is obviously appropriating the benefit of the patented
invention. It is for this reason that the doctrine of contributory
infringement, which prevents appropriating another man's patented
invention, has been characterized as 'an expression both of law and
morals.' 32 Considerable doubt and confusion as to the scope of contributory infringement has resulted from a number of the decisions
of the courts in recent years. The purpose of this section is to codify
in statutory form principles of contributory infringement and at the
same time eliminate this doubt and confusion. . . . " 3
To this end Section 271 became a part of title Thirty-five of the United
States Code:
ment of improvement patents under a license, and thus to acquire a new monopoly
outside the original patent) ; I.D. Russell Co. v. Dr. Salsbury's Laboratories, 198
F.2d 473, 474, 477 (8th Cir. 1952) ; Master Metal Strip Service, Inc. v. Protex
Weatherstrip Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 1948); Florence-Mayo Nuway
Co. v. Hardy, 168 F.2d 778, 785 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Landis Mach. Co. v. Chaso Tool,
Inc., 141 F.2d 800, 801 (6th Cir. 1944) (nothing has been left of the doctrine of
contributory infringement); Lempco Products, Inc. v. Simmons, 140 F.2d 58, 60n
(6th Cir. 1944) (what can be contributory infringement or invention now); Stone
v. Nelmor Corp., 101 F. Supp. 569, 570 (E.D. Mich. 1951) (distinguishing Mercoid) ;
Chiplets Inc. v. June Dairy Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 814, 817 (D.N.J. 1950) (following Mercoid, but not passing on possibility of suit after cessation of the misuse)
Aeration Processes v. Walter Kidde & Co., 77 F. Supp. 647, 654 (W.D.N.Y. 1947)
(discussing the applicability of Mercoid) ; Sunlite Mfg. Co. v. Clarvan Corp., 73
F. Supp. 938, 940 (E.D. Wisc. 1947) (expressing doubt of the existence of contributory infringement) ; Baker v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 979 (D.Mass. 1946) ;
American Optical Co. v. New Jersey Optical Co., 58 F. Supp. 601, 603-4 (D.Mass.
1944) (Mercoid just a license limiting case). These cases are by no means all the
contributory infringement cases nor do they cover the entire range of comment upon
the Mercoid decisions with regard to that doctrine. Considerable analysis of the
decisions was set out in academic and professional journals for some time after the
opinions were initially rendered. See MCCRADY, PATENT OFFICE PRACTICE § 84 ('3d
ed. 1950) : Cullen, The Practical Problem in Contributory Infringement Cases, 27
J.PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 827 (1945) ; Matthews, Contributory Infringement and the Mercoid
Case, 27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 260 (1945) ; Rich, Contributory Infringement, 31 J. PAT.

OFF. Soc'Y 449 (1949) ; Waite, Has the Doctrine of Contributory Infringement Been
Repealed?, 42 MICH. L. Rzv. 915 (1944):

Wood, The Tangle of Mercoid Case

Implications, 13 GEO. WASH. L. Rnv. 61 (1944). Notes, 12 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
345 (1944), 57 HARV. L. REv.
32. The characterization
Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320
33. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &

900 (1944), 57 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1944).
is that of Justice Frankfurter in Mercoid Corp. v.
U.S. 661, 677 (1944) (dissenting opinion).

Ai. Nzws 2394, 2402, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1952).
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§ 271. Infringement of Patent.
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United
States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces the infringement of a patent shall
be liable as an infringer.
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use
in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the
invention, knowing the same to be especially made or adapted for
use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use,
shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement
or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or be
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by
reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived
revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent
would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed
or authorized another to perform acts which if done without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3)
sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory
infringement."

34

Comment, in analyzing the above language, has generally expressed
However, not all
recognition of the congressional motives quoted earlier.
commentators have been satisfied that the doctrine is now restored to its
former vigor. Many do not consider a literal reading of the section at all
equivalent to the prior law.36 The event is now in the hands of the courts.
A. In The Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has yet to face squarely the problem of Mercoid
again. A search of the cases by this writer since the effective date of the
Patent Act of 1952 reveals that no question of contributory infringement
has been raised. But the defense of misuse has been heard in a suit including a count in direct infringement, United States Gypsum Co. v.
National Gypsum Co.37
34. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1952).
35. See note 33 supra. See also Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the
Patent Act of 1952, 21 Geo. WASH. L. REv. 521 (1953), 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 476
(1953); Turner, Contributory Infringement-Shall We Have Unfair Competition
By Judicial Sanction, 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 239 (1957) ; Notes, 66 HARV. L. REv. 909
(1953), 66 YA~u L. Rrv. 132 (1956).
36. See e.g., note 66 HARv. L. RIIv. 909 (1953) where question of the possible
effect of the statute on restrictive licenses and the defense of misuse in some cases
of direct infringement is raised.
37. 352 U.S. 457 (1957).
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The Gypsum litigation has a rather complicated history.3 8 An antitrust action by the United States had resulted in a declaration of unlawfulness of the industry-wide license agreements with price-fixing clauses
which the patent owner had made with his co-defendants. During the antitrust action the patent owner was under a court order not to seek enforcement of the questioned agreements, and the defendant-appellees in the instant
matter had used the patents without compensation to the hapless licensor
while all were defending the antitrust suit. Following the final decree in
that action the patent owner brought suit against its former licenseeco-defendants. 3 9 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia thought that the recovery sought ought to be prohibited: 1) for
the misuse adjudicated in the antitrust action which had not been purged,
2) for "fresh" misuse, and 3) for the "old" misuse even if the effects had
been dissipated. That court then modified its final decree in the antitrust
action to prohibit further prosecution of these suits, ordering them to be
dismissed with prejudice. 40 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded. The Court agreed that the determination in the antitrust action
precluded recovery of royalties, however it did not find sufficient evidence
of misuse on the record justifying a denial of compensation quantum meruit
or of damages for infringement from the erstwhile licensees.
The decision pointed out that the "old" misuse by necessary inference
had ended with the rescission of the unlawful agreements upon the court
order against enforcement pendente lite, that the general rule admitted of
suit under the aegis of the patent after purgation, and that no subsisting
prayer in the antitrust suit operated to give color to the claim that the
"old" misuse, purged or not, should bar recovery. But in passing on the
"fresh" misuse found below in the instigation of these suits with counts
on the old anti-competitive contracts, the Supreme Court disappointingly
avoided discussion of Section 271(d) (3). The district court considered
the statute, but thought the patent owner not "otherwise entitled to relief"
since there had already been adjudication of the license invalidity. By
resort to a procedural argument the Supreme Court found sufficient justification for the inclusion of the contract counts in the permitted pleading
of alternate theories, although the defense of misuse ran only to these
counts and the statute might have been invoked:
" [W] e think that it distorts the doctrine of patent misuse to hold
that recourse to this method of pleading here vitiated the other Counts
of the complaints." 41
There was also talk of the good faith of the appellant in interpreting the
antitrust decree as not barring royalty recovery. The minority opinion
38.
39.
40.
opinion
41.

Id. at 459-61.
Id. at 461.
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 124 F.Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1954),
on motion for new trial, 134 F.Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1955).
United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co. 352 U.S. 457, 467 (1957).
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by Justice Black, without reference at all to Section 271(d), attacked
the effectiveness of each of these arguments:
"Any attempt to enforce directly or indirectly any part of the illegal
agreements shows that the agreements and the conspiracy were still
in existence. .

.

. But under the Court's holding persons who mis-

use their patents hereafter, and who could not, under our prior cases,
recover compensation for patent use because of their illegal agreements, may now, in some instances, be able to recover full compensation
by labeling their causes of action 'indebitatus assumpsit' or 'quantum
meruit.'

42

B. In the Courts of Appeals.
Reluctance to indulge in construction of Section 271 has not been
confined to the Supreme Court. A number of circuit court opinions have
dealt with misuse as a defense to the enforcement of patent rights without
reliance on the statutory language. In a 1955 decision the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the assertion of the misuse
defense in F. C. Russell Co. v. Consumers Insulation Co. 43 There the
company required the distributors of its patented storm and screen windows
to maintain an exclusive sales agency and not to sell competing goods. It
also required the distributors to purchase from it the materials for constructing odd-sized windows. The court, proceeding by stipulation of the
parties entirely on the requirement of an exclusive sales agency, found
this to be, in itself, sufficient misuse to bar recovery from a third-party
competitor for infringement. This resolution is, of course, consistent both
in method and result with the trend in the Supreme ,Court both before and
after the enactment of Section 271, although its facts do not take it as far
44
as Mercoid.
The same court, just one year later, made a similar decision in Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co.4 5 There the patentee who owned
the rights to a greatly improved process for producing moir pattern tex-

tiles included price-fixing clauses in licenses to substantially three-fifths of
all producers in the field. Recognizing the weakened status of the General
Electric rule, 46 the court, while reversing the lower court on an issue of
patent validity, affirmed dismissal of the infringement suit insofar as it
sought recovery for the time preceding renegotiation of the license agreement. The defendant-licensee conceded that this was the date of purgation
of the misuse.
In Metals Disintegrating Co. v. Reynolds Metal Co.4 7 this court also
held infringement recovery to be barred before the end of misuse. The
42. Id. at 478.
43. 226 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1955).
44. For a case note in point see 42 VA. L. Rrv. 391 (1956).
45. 237 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1956).
46. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926)
patentee may license another to sell at a fixed price).
47. 228 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1956).

(ruling that the
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misuse found in the Metals Disintegratingcase was also price fixing. The
termination or purgation came when the defendant refused the plaintiffpatentee's offer to renegotiate the license agreement. The plaintiff had
sought to establish the end of misuse as of judicial determination of the
invalidity of the price-fixing clause, which determination, he argued,
48
effectively removed the misuse.
In a recent decision, 49 involving a heating system patent, the second
circuit was also able to determine issues of both infringement and contributory infringement in the face of asserted misuse without resort to
Section 271. The patent owner designed and guaranteed individualized
installations of his patented system. The infringer sold component parts
of the plaintiff's system and a companion company made infringing installations. The court rejected the contention that the patent holder, in
requiring the purchase of components for these systems to be from it, was
attempting to control an unpatented article. It was thought unnecessary to
apply Section 271 (d) or to rule on the applicability of Mercoid because the
conduct here was limited to systems which the patentee designed and guaranteed. The patentee was requiring the purchases only incidental to a
sale of the completed system.50
No misuse was found in Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Avco Mfg. Corp.5
Under a general license of all Hazeltine patents, payments were based on
the number of sets produced by the licensee without reference to use of
the patents embraced by the license.'5 2 A more recent trial court opinion
read the other way, distinguishing Hazeltine as a setting in which there
was no actual "tie-in" arrangement.53 This latter decision may be out of
line (unless another nice distinction is granted) with circuit court trends
in that it rejects the possibility of ever pleading business convenience.4
In the eighth circuit it has been held that Section 271 does not change
the rule of Carbice and Mercoid insofar as a staple is involved.3
The
48. Both the Newburgh and the Metals Disintegrating cases (although less
clearly the former) seem to be modified as to the time of purgation and the allowable extent of recovery by the Gypsum case discussed in the text supra. See note 79
infra.

49. Electric Pipe Lines, Inc. v. Fluid Systems, Inc., 231 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1956).
50. Ibid.
51. 227 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1955).
52. See also Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S.
827 (1950) which approved the same provisions.
53. American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 154 F. Supp. 890, 894-6
(D. Del. 1957).
54. Id. at 895. Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 247
F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1957) beginning at 351 disposes of a defense of misuse on evidence
that the conduct of the defendant (plaintiff on the counterclaim there in question)
was motivated not by monopolistic purpose, but "solely by honest business considerations." (at 355, quoting the trial court.)
55. Dr. Salsbury's Laboratories v. I. D. Russell Co. Laboratory, 212 F.2d 414
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 837 (1954), 28 TSMP. L. Q. 148 (1954). In the
affirmed decision, Dr. Salsbury's Laboratories v. I.D. Russell Co. Laboratory, 121
F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mo. 1953), it was stated by the court: "I am unable to determine
that the statutory revision, whether it be a change in the law or a codification, has
changed the law as defined by the courts with respect to the use of 'a staple.
Id. at 711.
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patentee of a poultry nutritive mixture sought to recover for active inducement of infringement and contributory infringement. Both the plaintiff
and the defendant sold an adulterated chemical compound with directions
to mix it with water in certain proportions specified in the patent. 0 Suit
on substantially the same facts had been previously barred for misuse "
after a finding that the unclaimed compound as sold dry was a staple commodity although the patentee had asserted that it was not identical with
the standard commercial compound also used in the industry. 8
In the same year, in Cole v. Hughes Tool Co.,0 9 the tenth circuit
found no misuse in the assertion of the right to prevent others from reconstructing the patented drilling bits which the patentee had leased to drilling
companies. This was a reversal of the district court which had held the
suit to be for the purpose of extending the patentee's monopoly beyond its
proper scope.60 The suit was commenced before enactment of Section 271.
It also should be noted that the court of appeals rejected the lower court's
finding of an antitrust violation predicated on the absence of true price
competition.
In a number of recent cases contributory infringement has been found
under Section 271.
Southern States Equip. Corp. v. USCO Power
Equip.; 61 Freedman v. Friedman;02 Marks v. Polaroid Corp; 0 Sasser v.
Senco Products, Inc.64 In the Southern States case, those who supplied
castings to a closely allied corporation with which infringing commercial
electric switches were made were found to be liable as contributory infringers. The court said that these defendants undoubtedly knew that the
manufactured castings, with insignificant exception, were incapable of any
use other than in the offending devices.
"Under all the facts and circumstances, it having been shown that the
castings had utility only in the switches which they either knew constituted an infringement, or should fairly be charged with such knowl56. See Rumford Chemical Works v. Hecker, 20 Fed. Cas. 1342, No. 12,133
(C.C.D.N.J. 1876) (contributory infringer sold elements, less water, necessary to
plaintiff's patented baking process).
57. I. D. Russell Co. v. Dr. Salsbury's Laboratories, 198 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1952).
58. The fourth circuit, in a case mainly concerned with a reissue problem, dealt
in part with an almost identical situation. Involved were a patented fungicide and
Nabam, its principal and an unpatented component. The court said: "[S]ince the
evidence shows that Nabam, apart from its use as a fungicide, is not a staple article
of commerce, it became practible to bring suit for contributory infringement against
sellers of the composition who knew it was especially adapted for use in infringing
the patent." Rohm & Haas Co. v. Roberts Chemicals, 245 F.2d 693, 699 (4th Cir.
1957) (but did the court mean use in this fungicide or any fungicide). See 3 VILL.
L. REV. 413 (1958).
59. 215 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 (1955).
60. Hughes Tool Co. v.'
Ford, 114 F.Supp. 525, 554 (E.D. Okla. 1953).
61. 209 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1953).
62. 242 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. (1957).
63. 237 F.2d 428 (lst Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1005 (1957).
64. 242 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1957).
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edge, their intent to engage in contributory infringement was presumed
as a matter of law, particularly in the absence of any contrary or
rebutting evidence." 65
Similar emphasis on intent appears in the Freedman case. The lower
court had rendered judgment for the defendant,' saying that he neither
knew nor intended that the specially formed magnets he sold would be used
in an infringing construction of the plaintiff's patented dentures. In the
words of the court discussing Section 271 (c) :
"[T] here is no indication of any intent to make knowledge that there
was a patent and that it was being infringed necessary to liability for
contributory infringement. .

.

. The intent necessary

is that the

article sold be used in the article or process which constitutes infringement, not that the seller must know or intend that a patent will be
infringed by that article or process." 87
The Marks case involved patents for producing polarized viewers used
in obtaining a three-dimensional effect in viewing motion pictures. The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld judgment for
the defendant on its counterclaim, charging infringement and contributory
infringement. The defense of misuse was raised and rejected in the trial
court.6 8 This rejection was upheld by the court of appeals which proclaimed
the matter within the discretion of the trial court.0 9 After declaring the
patent of the defendant infringed, the appellate court went on to hold that
the plaintiff was the moving and conscious force behind the infringing
corporation's actions, and further, "This is clearly enough to make him
liable under general principles,

.

.

.

as well as under Title 35 U.S.C.

",70
§ 271 (b) ...
A per curiam opinion in the Sasser case in the sixth circuit argued
that one who sold components of the plaintiff's patented stapler was a
contributory infringer under Section 271 (c).71

65. 209 F.2d at 121 (after citing Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912). See
note 15 supra.
66. Freedman v. Friedman, 142 F. Supp. 426 (D. Md. 1956).
67. 242 F.2d at 367. In line with this decision, the court of appeals, in a proceeding against another infringer of the same patent, approved the inference of
knowledge needed for 271(c) liability from the nature of the article sold. But a
literal reading is a bit confusing. In discussing the character of the article as a staple
vel non, the court seems to involve the finished combination as well as the article
sold by the defendant. Freedman v. Overseas Scientific Corp., 248 F.2d 274, 276 (2d.
Cir. 1957).
68. Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. 243 (D. Mass. 1955).
69. 237 F.2d at 437.
70. Id. at 435. On the matter'of intent, as developed in the Southern States, Freedman, and Marks cases, see notes 6, 8 and 9 supra.
71. An even more recent per curiam opinion in the Second Circuit, Transmira
Products Corp. v. Fourco Glass Co., 246 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1957) (July 31), in
resolving a problem of venue found no violation of Section 271 (b) or (c) in the
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C. The District Courts
A few district court decisions not heretofore covered are all that remain to be examined of the case material embraced by this Comment.
Probably one of the first cases in which Section 271 was examined was
Gangier Fibre Products Co. v. Fourslides, Inc.72 which considered the
defendant's sale to a third party of a device for the easy affixation of fiberboard automobile interiors to the car body. It was found that the plaintiff's claimed patent was invalid and that the plaintiff therefore sought
control of an unpatented article and a staple commodity of commerce:
"[S] ince the new patent law was enacted with the specific purpose of
stabilizing and clarifying much of patent case law we can but agree
with its conclusion that one who uses a staple article or commodity
of commerce suitable for non-infringing use is not a contributory infringer." 7.
The parties in the case of Carter Products, Inc. v. Colgate-Pahnolive
Co. 74 stipulated that if the patent in question there were valid, that the
defendants had infringed it. The patent was upon a method of producing
a shaving or other lather without manual or mechanical whipping. It was
found valid. Some of the defendants acted as agents of others in combining the ingredients, packing the product, and shipping it to the trade;
another defendant bought it ready for sale. With regard to these defendants, the court remarked: "We are not, however, prepared to say that they
'actively induced' infringement, or knowingly contributed to it, within the
meaning of Section 271(a) and (b)." 75
Section 271 (b) was also put forward as a basis of liability in Jones v.
Radio Corp. of America,76 but there it was found sufficiently applicable to
deny dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint in contributory infringement.
The defendant argued that under the new statute, Section 271 (c), he could
not be liable unless he sold a component of the patented combination. It
territory of the southern district of New York. The conduct there was the distribution of a booklet advertising a certain glass which the patentee claimed, but could
not prove, was suited for an infringing use, nor did the plaintiff prove it was not
a staple. See also Kamkap, Inc. v. Worldsbest Inds., Inc., 140 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) (also dismissed on a venue problem; orders for the alleged infringing sales
were taken in New York, but they were accepted in Wisconsin).
72. 112 F. Supp. 926 (E.D. Mich. 1953).
73. Id. at 932. See also Apex Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Altofer Bros. Co., 130 F. Supp.
152 (S.D. I11.1955) (misuse found in patent pooling and block booking), rev'd, 238
F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1956) (reversed on this point because no credible evidence in the
record).
74. 130 F. Supp. 557 (D. Md. 1955), aff'd, 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1956) and
243 F.2d 163 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1957) (Mr. Justice Douglas
being of the opinion that the petition for certiorari ought to be granted).
75. Id. at 571. Note that liability under (b) which is in the nature of contributory infringement liability is expressed "as an infringer." See 35 U.S.C. § 271
(1952).
76. 131 F. Supp. 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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was held, however, that the allegations would support liability "as an
infringer" under Section 271 (b) where, before the issue of the patent, the
defendant secured information regarding it and passed it to another, intending that there would be an infringement of the patent when issued.
It was noted that this intent would previously support an action for contributory infringement when coupled with this conduct.
In construing Section 271(d), the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois has made the most positive statement to
date with regard to the relationship of the new statute to the Mercoid cases:
"The Court holds, accordingly, that the said Act of 1952 makes proper
and lawful that which, under the doctrine of the Mercoid cases . . . would

have been misuse of the patent." 77 This was announced as the holding in
Sola Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co. 78 on the issue of misuse, but it must
be regarded as dictum since the patent in suit was held invalid on account
of prior art and therefore not infringed. The conduct in the Sola case consisted in selling unpatented ballast and giving to the purchaser a license to
construct the plaintiff's patented circuit using the ballast. The courts had
felt strongly inclined to say that this sort of conduct was violative of the
principle in the Mercoid cases, but it said:
"The Court has considered the statute in question, the cases and
articles relating to it, and the arguments of counsel and cannot escape
the conviction that it was the purpose of Congress to change the law
as announced in the two Mercoid cases..

.

The ballasts . . . are

'a material part of the invention' and are not 'a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.' 79

Similar dicta exists in Calhoun v. State Chemical Mfg. Co.80 wherein
executors of a patentee sought to recover for infringement. The patent
involved an inventive combination of an 0-ring, grooved piston, and a
cylinder of specified proportions which provided a very effective seal for
77. Sola Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 146 F. Supp. 625, 648 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
78. Ibid., 35 Tx. L. Rzv. 738 (1957); 25 U. CIN. L. Rzv. 521 (1956); 42 VA.
L. Rzv. 1140 (1956) ; 14 WASH. &Lim L. Rzv. 280 (1957).
79. 146 F. Supp. at 647. An earlier decision of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois indicates that Mercoid still retains some vigor there. United
States v. Crown-Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1956) antitrust action
for an injunction against the use of patent power to make a division of the market).
In another case, plaintiffs in a private antitrust action had previously been declared
infringers of the defendants' patents; they now claimed a conspiracy by the defendants in pooling patents in violation of the antitrust laws. Mercoid was cited, but the
plaintiffs were precluded by the former decree, save as to losses on unpatented materials and tools.
"They did not proffer a defense in that action that was known to them.... The
conclusion is that the impact of any conspiracy between the defendants, resulting
from the giving of notices of infringement and prosecution of an infringement action
against the plaintiffs terminated with the entry of that decree. Hence plaintiffs cannot recover herein from defendants damages resulting to any of their business operations after the entry of said decree, because of claimed impact [of these acts]."
Mason City Tent & Awning Co. v. Clapper, 144 F. Supp. 754, 769 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
80. 153 F. Supp: 293 (N.D. Ohio 1957).
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the piston in the cylinder. A sales agent was the nominal defendant. The
real defendants in the case were a manufacturer of an infringing combination and a manufacturer of O-rings who supplied this infringer. It
was alleged that the patent was being misused to monopolize O-rings.
The court found insufficient evidence to support the asserted defense of
misuse, and it proceeded to a discussion of Section 271(d) and Section 271
in general. The court stated the applicability of Section 271 (d) in the
words of the section itself. It was argued that the provisions of Section 271 (d) did not apply because the O-ring was, a staple under Section
271 (c). The court indicated that even the vendor of staples might be liable
as an infringer under Section 271(b) :
"Assuming, but not deciding, that O-rings are staple articles of
commerce, it does not follow that a seller of such articles would in no
event be liable as a contributory infringer...

[I]t is clear that

each of those paragraphs [Section 271(b) and (c)
type of contributory infringement." 81

defines a different

On the basis of these cases, it seems possible now to make some conclusions regarding present judicial attitude toward the doctrine of contributory
2
infringement and the defense of misuse.
III.
CONCLUSION.

The fugue is not wholly heard yet, but the first polyphonic strains are
in the main consistent with the score of the congressional composition.
In the basic theme, the element of contributory infringement is slightly
more dominant than in less recent renditions. On the other hand, the role
of the defense of misuse will be materially limited if the judicial attitude
expressed now becomes the prevailing one. True, some respected inter.preters have struck discordants. But, it is agreed that to some extent at
least Carbice, Mercoid, et al. are to be played pianissimo.
Aside from liability for direct infringement, the statute embodies two
species of liability "as an infringer." They are set out in Section 271 (b)
and (c). Only the latter is explicitly referred to as, contributory infringement although both partake of that nature. Under the former subsection,
the courts have faithfully and literally interpreted the congressional score,
punishing those who would appropriate the benefit of another's patented
invention. Two major cases facing the problem of alleged contributory
81. Id. at 301.
82. In a recent case, the contention was dismissed that there was misuse in
granting a price concession to the pioneer distributor and advertiser of the plaintiff's
patented product. Pemco Products, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 433, 437
(N.D. Ohio 1957).
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infringement and not imposing liability have done so consistently with the
statutory expression, although one of the cases invoked Mercoid.8 3 It may
be said then there is unanimity of opinion, insofar as there is opinion, that
contributory infringement exists today in that liability is imposed for
actively inducing another's infringement of a patent. The "weight" of a
paucity of authority would apply 271 (b) without regard to the exception
for staples made in (c).
The judicial reading of Section 271(c) also seems to be on a quite
literal level, but less uniform. The majority of courts discussing this subsection have expressed opinions that restore the doctrine to its former
value and application. The fourth circuit has even defined the necessary
intent in apparently more liberal terms than originally obtained. 4 The
extent of liability for selling an article not suitable for substantial noninfringing use has been restored at least to its primeval limits, although it
may not yet be as broad as some advocates of the contributory infringement
rule would have it.
Of course the greatest doubts concerning contributory infringement
were not on the positive aspect of enforcement. The confusion arose mainly
from the denial of enforcement under the negative pressures of "anti-anticompetitive" policy which culminated in Mercoid. Correcting this was the
business of Section 271 (d). It is understandably the most delicate problem confronting the interpreters and critics. Two of the strongest policies
in American law are brought into conflict by the defense of misuse. The
"economic constitution" is played against an expression of the political
Constitution. 5
The harmony envisioned by the librettist-arrangers in Congress in
committing the old theme to paper has not been fully realized. Where
there has been a violation of the letter of the antitrust laws, the patentee
is definitely still barred from remedy against one who appropriates the
benefit of his invention directly or indirectly. Unless the Gypsum minority
rightly reads the majority in that case, there remains some small question
as to the possibility and extent of recovery after purgation of the misue.88
Where the alleged violation is contrary only to the spirit of the antitrust
laws, there is an unusual reluctance to comment on the effect of Section 271 (d). This restraint is, of course, to be admired. Cases directly
opposing the defense of misuse to patent enforcement have been tendered
to the Supreme Court in a number of postures. 87 They have been uniformly
83. Carter Products, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 557 (D. Md.
1955) (court did not find active inducement); Dr. Salsbury's Laboratories v. I. D.
Russell Co. Laboratory, 212 F. 2d 414 (8th Cir. 1954) (staples, citing Mercoid case).
84. See notes 9 and 67 supra.
85. See Oppenheimer, Patents and Antitrust: Peaceful Coexistence?, 54 MICH.
L. REv. 199 (1955). See also DREws, THE PATENT RIGHT (1952) (on the economic
aspects of the patent right).
86. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957).
See also note 48 supra.
87. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957);
Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 237 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1005
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denied hearing, with the notable exceptions of the Gypsum case which was
a clear matter of direct infringement and the solo willingness of Justice
Douglas to review the Carter Products case.""
Cole v. Hughes Tool Co. provides foundation for the hope that misuse
in the mere bringing of suit has been effectively eliminated. It sounds as
though most courts will also give full and literal meaning to subsection (d)
and all of Section 271.9 However, if the issues of Mercoid, or some of
them, were again presented to the Supreme Court, there would likely be
another great division of opinion. At least, insofar as past individual expression of its members is a prefiguration of disharmony.
As a practical matter, the final review must await the critics' pleasure.
But, as another practical matter, the public may anticipate the news, especially where, as here, the reviewers include the performers. It has been
seen before that rumblings reported on the percussion section, the lower
courts, often resolve into an order portending the rhythm adopted by the
whole orchestra. The pattern is seen as well in an air developing out of
the circuit woodwinds and taken up by the dominating strings. Neither
development is necessary by the nature of things, yet as the concert begins
anew, it is possible within reasonable limits to predict the range and mood
in which the conductor and concertmasters are disposed to play Section 271.
It is also possible to suggest that the interpretation will tend to lie close
to the written page, but only bolder exercise of the courts on appropriate
opportunity will tell.
George S. Forde, Jr.

TRADE MARKS-LANHAM

AcT-LIABILITY

OF RETAIL

SELLER FOR

GOOD FAITH SALES OF GOODS WITH INFRINGING TRADE MARK.

After almost eight years of congressional hearings the Lanham Act'
was signed by President Truman on July 5, 1946, and became operative
on July 5, 1947. The main purposes of drafting the act were to incorporate
all existing trade mark statutes into a single piece of legislation; to simplify
trade mark practice in order to secure trade mark owners in the good will
which they have built up; and to protect the public from imposition by the
(1957); Cole v. Hughes Tool Co., 215 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 927 (1955) ; Carter Products, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 557
(D. Md. 1955), aff'd, 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1957)
(Mr. Justice Douglas of the opinion the petition ought to be granted). A petition
for certiorari in Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 247 F.2d
343 (2d Cir. 1957) recently presented the opportunity to apply Section 271, if the
Court had desired to reach the question, cert. denied, 78 Sup. Ct. 537 (1958).
88. See note 87 supra.
89. See Sola Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 146 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
1. 60 STAT. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1957).
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use of counterfeit and imitated marks and false trade descriptions. 2
tion 32(1) (a) provides for the liability of:

Sec-

.. . any person who shall, in commerce, use, without the consent
of the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of any registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive
purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods or services." a
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss the applicability of this
section to a retail seller, such as a metropolitan department store which
buys goods from a supplier who has put an infringing trade mark on them,
and sells them to the public without knowing of the infringement. If the
section does encompass such a retail seller, it could well be that the unknowing seller will not only be enjoined from selling such goods 4 but also
will be required to account to the true owner of the infringed trade mark for
the profits resulting from the sales of such goods, and also be liable to him
in damages.- The extent of liability of and the avenues of redress open to
the unknowing retailer will also be examined. Decisions dealing with such
a retail seller are relatively few and no case yet has held that section
32(1) (a) applies to this situation. It is not our purpose to determine
whether or not there has been. a trade mark infringement on various factual
situations or what constitutes an infringement. Our starting point is that
there actually has been an infringement of a validly registered trade mark.

APPLICABILITY OF SECTION

I.
32(1) (a)

TO RETAIL SELLERS.

To determine whether it was the intent of the drafters of the Act
that a retail seller, who in good faith sells goods with an infringing mark
on them, was to come within section 32(1) (a), it will be necessary to first
determine if all retailers are comprehended by that section. To do this
we will review the history of the original bill and comment on the reasons
for any pertinent modifications that were made. The bill in its original
form was introduced by Mr. Lanham on March 3, 1939.6 In that bill
(H.R. 4744) section 32 read:
"Any person who shall . . . colorably imitate any trade mark
. . . and shall affix such . . . colorable imitation to merchandise
2. U.S. CoDe CONG. Nnws 1276 (1946).
3.60 STAT. 437 (1946); 15 U.S.C. §1114 (1) (a) (1952).
4. 60 STAT. 439 (1946) ;15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1952).
5. 60 STAT. 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1952) provides: "When a violation
of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent Office shall have
been established . . . the plaintiff shall be entitled . . . subject

to

the principles of

equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff,
and (3) the costs of the action . . .
6. 84 CONG.Rc. 2242 (1939).
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of such a character that the use thereof is likely to cause confusion
or mistake or to deceive purchasers, or to labels .

.

.

intended to

be used upon or in connection with the sale of such merchandise, and
shall use or have used such .

.

. colorable imitation in commerce,

shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for any or all of the
remedies hereinafter provided." 7 (Emphasis added.)
Certainly our retail seller could not come within this section as we
have presumed that he did not affix the colorable imitation (infringing
mark) to the goods or labels, but rather that his supplier did. However,
it was believed that the section was not broad enough to give the needed
protection,8 and so section 32 (repeated in H.R. 6618) was changed to read:
"Any person who shall, (a) .
. , or (b) shall apply such .

.
.

. colorably imitate any mark
. colorable imitation to mer-

chandise or services of such a character that the use thereof is likely
to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers, or to labels,
signs, . . . , or advertisements intended to be used upon or in con-

nection with the sale of such merchandise or services, or (c) shall
otherwise falsely indicate that the goods or services are the goods or
services of a person who shall have registered a mark under this Act,
shall be liable. ..

."

(Emphasis added.)

Here again, we see that subsections (a) and (b) do not apply to our
situation, since the retail seller is not applying the colorable imitation to
the goods, labels or advertisements. 10 However, it would not be straining the language of subsection (c) to say that it applies to our "good faith"
retail seller because by the mere fact that he has the goods on display in
his store he does ".

.

. indicate that the goods or services are the goods

or services of a person who shall have registered a mark under this
Act ... ." Regardless of this, the entire section 32 was amended in
H.R. 102 to read:
"Any person who shall

.

(a) use

....

any colorable imita-

tion of any registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, or advertising of any goods or services of such a character that
such use is likely to cause confusion . . .; or (c) . .

colorably

7. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Trade Marks of the House Committee
on Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1939). Section 34 of the bill enabled the plaintiff
to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and
(3) the costs of the action.
8. Hearings,supra note 7, at 151-152.
9. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Trade Marks of the House Committee
on Patents,76th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1939).
10. Although a retail seller might use the infringing mark in his newspaper advertisements, that part of § 32 (b) dealing with the application of the infringing
mark to labels, signs or advertisements was intended only to make the -printers of
the labels and signs and the newspapers liable. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Trade Marks of the House Committee on Patents, 77th Cong., lst Sess. 177 (1941).
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imitate any such mark and apply such . . . colorable imitation to
labels . . . packages . . . or advertisements intended to be used
upon or in connection with the sale of such goods . . . shall be
liable . ..
.",,1

The retail dealer uses 12 the colorable imitation of the registered mark
in connection with the sale or offering for sale or advertising of the goods
by the mere fact that he does not remove the infringing mark of the supplier before he sells the goods. Therefore, strictly speaking, he should
come within the meaning of subsection (a) of the amended bill.
It was at this stage of the Act's history that there was some discussion
during the hearings as to a seller's liability under the Act.
Under the amended bill -the printers, labelers, and newspapers were
liable for damages and profits even though they did not perform their
services with knowledge that it was going to be misused by the person
actually applying the infringing mark to his goods. Professor Handler 13
came to the rescue of the newspaper publishers (and indirectly to the
printers' and labelers' rescue) when he appeared before the House of
Representatives Sub-committee on Trade Marks. In attempting to mitigate their liability, he said:
"Isn't there an intermediate position that might be taken: if the
complainant claims there is an infringement why should he not go
against the man who is infringing? If he cannot reach him or get
service upon him, since the goods are upon the market, he can sue
anyone selling or distributing the merchandise. Those are the people
who are directly concerned in the controversy. Isn't it the fair and
decent thing for a man claiming infringement to go against him who
makes or him who sells the product?" 14 (Emphasis added.)
Professor Handler therefore believed that the one who sells the product
with the infringing mark is on an equal footing with the one who makes
the goods with the infringing mark. And since the latter is certainly liable
for damages and profits, the seller should also be liable for them. Also,
since the seller is not made liable in any other subsection, Professor Handler
must have believed that he came under. subsection (a).
11. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Trade Marks of the House Committee
on Patents, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1941). Section 35 of this bill gave the plaintiff
the same relief as the amended bill.
12. The use of a trade mark does not necessarily and as a matter of law import
that the articles upon which it is used are manufactured by its user. It may be enough
that they are manufactured for him, that he controls their production, or even that
they pass through his hands in the course of trade and that he gives to them the
benefit of his reputation, or of his name and business style. Nelson v. J. H. Winchell
& Co., 203 Mass. 75, 89 N.E. 180 (1909).
13. Milton Handler, Assistant Professor of Law, Columbia University, N.Y. City.
14. Hearings,supra note 11, at 122.
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Mr. Jennings Bailey, Jr.15 testified that subsection (a) is "obviously
intended only to apply to the actual infringer. That is the person who
sells the goods." 16 Most likely he did not mean simply the initial seller,
i.e., the manufacturer, but rather the ultimate seller, i.e., the retail seller,
since it is only at this stage of the distribution process that the infringed
mark is actually harmed-when the average purchasing consumer becomes
confused. If this is so, then the retail seller is within the meaning of subsection (a) and also liable for damages and profits.
As a result of Professor Handler's and Mr. Bailey's testimony the
American Bar Association's recommended modifications were adopted and
section 32 now makes the printers, labelers, and newspapers liable only
for an injunction and not for damages and profits unless their acts have
been committed with knowledge that such mark is intended to be used to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers. 17 However, reading
section 32(1) (a) literally and in conjunction with the above statements
of Professor Handler and Mr. Bailey (which were not denied or objected
to in any way by the members of the Subcommittee on Trade Marks), it
would be safe to say that retail sellers were intended to come within its
meaning.
If the retailer does not come within section 32(1) (a), it would mean
that he is subject to no liability under the Act because subsection 32(1) (b)
clearly refers only to printers, labelers, wrappers and newspapers. This
absence of liability was most probably not intended since, as we shall see
later, a retailer selling goods with an infringing trade mark in good faith
should at least be enjoinable by the one whose trade mark had been
infringed.
II.
EXTENT OF LIABILITY.

Prior to the passage of the Lanham Act the general rule under the
prior act in regard to a manufacturer who infringed a registered trade
mark was that damages or an accounting of profits would not be given
where the wrongful use of the trade mark was merely accidental or without
any actual wrongful intent to defraud a plaintiff or to deceive the public.18
However, section 35 of the Lanham Act 19 provides that where there has
been an infringement under the Act, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject
15. Chairman, Committee on Legislation, Section of Patents, Trade Mark and
Copyright Law, American Bar Association.

16. Hearings, supra note 11, at 177.
17. 60 STAT. 437 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2) (1952).
18. Hemmeter Cigar Co. v. Congress Cigar Co., 118 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1941)
Gemex Co. v. J. & K. Sales Co., 76 F. Supp. 150 (D.R.I. 1947), aff'd, 166 F.2d 569
(1st Cir. 1948); J. A. Dougherty's Sons v. Dougherty, 36 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Pa.
1940); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Emener, 16 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Mich 1936);
Pease v. Scott County Milling Co., 5 F.2d 524 (E.D. Mo. 1925).
19. 60 STAT. 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1952).
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to the provision of sections 29 ° and 32(1) (b), 21 and subject to the principles of equity, to recover: (1) defendant's profits,2 (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, 23 and (3) the costs of the action. Since the Act
makes no specific provisions as to willfulness other than to provide that
neither profits nor damages shall be recovered against an innocent defendant (one who unknowingly infringes) who is only the printer or publisher
of infringing material, and since it also regards registration as constructive
notice,2 4 registered trade marks, would seem to be eliminated as to any
possible defense of good faith use and so subject even the ignorant infringer
to full liability.25 A good faith infringing manufacturer was held liable
for damages and profits in the case of Lucien Lelong Inc. v. Dana Perfumes,
Inc.2 6 Therefore, since a manufacturer is liable for damages and profits
even when he unknowingly infringes a trade mark, the retail dealer who
unknowingly sells such goods should be equally liable if both come within
the meaning of sections 32 and 35 of the Lanham Act.
There are only a few cases directly on point as to the extent of a
retailer's liability for innocently selling goods with infringing marks on
them. In the case of Liberty Oil Corp. v. Crawley, Milner & Co.,27 the
defendant was enjoined from selling certain goods which had an infringing
mark on them, but he was not liable for profits or damages sustained by
the plaintiff prior to the time he had notice of the infringement. According
to the court in Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Schmidt,28 dealers buying from manufacturers are to a certain extent put upon inquiry and must be on their
guard to ascertain whether the marks and labels on packages are infringe20. 60 STAT. 436 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (1952) provides that no profits or
damages shall be recovered if the plaintiff did not give notice that his mark is registered
by displaying with the mark as used the words "Registered in U.S. Patent Office"
or "Reg. U.S. Pat. Off." or the letter R enclosed within a circle, thus ®, unless
the defendant had actual notice of the registration.
21. 60 STAT. 437 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1) (b) (1952) provides that as
against the printers and newspapers, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover
profits or damages unless their acts have been committed with knowledge that such
mark is intended to be used to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers.
22. 60 STAT. 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1952) also provides that in assessing
profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant's sales only. Defendant must
prove all elements of cost or deductions claimed.
23. Damages may include: injury to the plaintiff's reputation and good will,
Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co., 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1941) ; expenses, such
as advertising or change of ,name, incurred in order to differentiate his product from
that of the infringing defendant, Int'l Film Service Co. Inc. v. Associated Producers,
Inc., 273 Fed. 585, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (dictum) ; and reduced profits due to sales
at lowered prices, Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co., supra.
24. 60 STAT. 435 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1952) provides that: "Registration
of a mark . . . shall be constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership
thereof."
25. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADS-MARKS § 87.2 (b) (1) (2d ed.
1950) ; Comment, 68 HARV. L. Rgv. 814, 867 (1955).
26. 138 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Ill. 1955) ; accord, Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your
Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Matarazzo v. Isabella, 138 F. Supp.
86 (D.R.I. 1956).
27. 270 Mich. 187, 258 N.W. 241 (1935) ; accord, Saratoga Vichy Spring Co.
v. Saratoga Carlsbad Corp., 45 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ; Pro-Phy-Lac-Tic Brush
Co. v. Abraham and Straus, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 660 (E.D.N.Y. 1935).
28. 196 Fed. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
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ments of the trade marks of other manufacturers, and are not protected
from liability for selling articles bearing such infringing trade marks by the
fact that it is not conclusively shown that they intentionally deceived purchasers. On the contrary, proof of the sales gives rise to a presumption
of intentional deception. Even -with such strong reasoning the court in
that case refused an accounting and gave only injunctive relief. However,
these decisions were no more than applications of the then prevailing
general rule that damages or an accounting will not be ordered when the
infringing party acted innocently and in ignorance of the plaintiff's rights
29
provided such party stops his illegal practices after he discovers the truth.
Since this general rule has been abrogated by the Lanham Act, it may well
be that a contrary result will be reached when the same type case arises
in the future.
It is to be remembered that section 35 30 provides that a registrant
whose rights have been violated, shall, subject to the principles of equity,
be entitled to recover damages and the defendant's profits. The word shall
seems to make it mandatory that the plaintiff recover damages and profits,
but this is substantially the same language which was in the Trade Mark
Act of 1905.31 The courts gave that language a liberal construction 82 in
view of its being conditioned on the principles of equity. 88 Therefore,
today under the Lanham Act, a court would have little difficulty in refusing
damnages and profits, when the defendant retailer innocently sold goods
which had infringing marks, on the grounds that it would be inequitable
4
to grant such recovery.
However, such a decision could very well militate against one of the
fundamental objectives of the trade mark statute, that is, to protect the
public in such a way that it may be confident in purchasing a product bearing a trade mark which it favorably knows that it will get the product which
it asks for and wants to get.35 So long as people have the right to exercise
a freedom of choice, they deserve to get what they ask for when they buy
in the marketplace. 0 The best way to protect the public from being confused or deceived in selecting certain goods (which have infringing marks
29. NIMS, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS 1078 (3rd ed. 1929).
30. 60 STAT.439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1952).
31. 33 STAT. 729 (1905) (later amended by 60 STAT. 427, 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (1952),
provided that .. .the court shall have power to grant injunctions, according to the
principles of equity . . . and upon a decree being rendered in any such case for
wrongful use of a trade mark the complainant shall be entitled to recover, inaddition
to the profits to be accounted for by the defendant, the damages the complainant has
sustained thereby, and the court shall assess the same or cause the same to be assessed
under its direction .. "
32. Cases cited note 17, supra.
33. ROBERrS, THE Nzw TRADE MARK MANUAL 216 (1947).
34. This result has been reached by several courts where the innocent infringer was
the manufacturer who applied the infringing mark to the goods. Square D Co. v.
Sorenson, 244 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1955); National Drying Machinery Co. v. Achoff,
129 F.Supp. 389 (D.C.Pa. 1955).
35. U.S. CODE CONG. N.ws 1274 (1946).
36. ROBERTS, op. cit. supra note 33, at 158.
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on them and which they would not select if they knew they were not the
plaintiff's goods) is to prevent such goods from getting into the hands of the
retail sellers. The easiest way to achieve this result is to hold the retailers
liable 'in damages and profits, as only then will they take adequate precautions to make sure their suppliers do not put infringing marks on their
goods in order to deceive the public. They are compelled to be on their
guard to determine whether or not the goods they sell contain infringing
marks for purposes of an injunction, 7 and if their buying public is to be
adequately protected they should also be compelled to be on their guard
38
for purposes of damages and profits.

III.
RELIEF FOR THE RETAIL SELLER.

Although we have stated that a good faith retail dealer may be liable
under the Lanham Act for damages and profits as a result of selling goods
with an infringing mark, this is not to say he can not recover these losses
from his supplier who actually applied the infringing mark to the goods.
One way to allow such recovery is to say that the supplier as a seller to
the purchasing retail seller has breached an implied warranty that the goods
do not infringe a third person's rights. Although the Uniform Sales Act
does not deal expressly with this situation, 9 the Uniform Commercial
Code provides:
"Unless otherwise agreed there is in a contract for sale a warranty
by the seller that . . . the goods shall be delivered . . . free from

any rightful claim of any third person by way of infringement or
otherwise.
Since the Uniform Commercial Code also enables any buyer to recover consequential damages as a result of any seller's breach of warranty, 41 the
37. Cases cited note 27, supra.
38. However, by allowing a plaintiff damages and profits, this does not mean
that a double recovery may be obtained by plaintiff. That would be the case if the
plaintiff were given both the profits on the defendant's sales and the lost profits on
the sales the plaintiff would have made but for the infringement. This result is avoided
by restricting the plaintiff who has recovered profits to damages other than those
from loss of sales. See Century Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling Co., 205 F.2d

140 (3rd Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 900 (1953).
39. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 13 (2) and (3) provides: "In a contract to sell or
a sale, unless a contrary intention appears there is . . .

(2) An implied warranty that the buyer shall have and enjoy quiet possession of the goods as against any lawful claims existing at the time of sale;
(3) An implied warranty that the goods shall be free at the time of the sale
from any charge or encumbrance in favor of any third person, not disclosed or known

to the buyer before or at the time when the contract or sale is made." It could easily
be argued that either of these sections are applicable to this situation.
40.

UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL

CODE

§ 2-312. The comment to this section states:

"When the goods are part of the seller's normal stock and are sold in his normal
course of business, it is his duty to see that no claim of infringement of a patent
or trademark by a third party will mar the buyer's title."
41. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-714 and 2-715.
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retail seller can recover from his supplier consequential damages equal to
the amount of damages (including profits) he was forced to pay the person
whose trade mark was infringed.
Another basis for relief as to the retailer could be that the supplier
was negligent in that he knew or should have known that the goods he sold
contained an infringing trade mark and that it was reasonably foreseeable
that the person whose mark was infringed would bring an action against
the retailer, as a result of the infringement.
IV.
CONCLUSION.

Even though a court may decide in the future that a retail seller
is within the meaning of section 32(1) (a) of the Lanham Act, it may or
may not hold him liable for damages and profits under section 35. If it
believes that the paramount interest to be protected is the right of the public
not to be deceived or confused as to the source of origin of the goods
the public buys from the retailer, then a court could readily make the
retailer liable for damages and profits even though he innocently sold
goods bearing infringing marks, since only then will the retailer make it a
However, if the court believes the main
point not to sell such goods.4
purpose of the Lanham Act is to protect the registered trade mark owner,
it could easily limit the relief to an injunction in such a situation on the
grounds that it would be inequitable to grant damages and profits since
the retailer acted in good faith and did not himself apply the infringing
This would produce the same result as prior law
mark to the .goods.but would be contrary to one of the objectives of the Lanham Act; namely,
to make registration stronger and to give more effective relief against
44
infringement.
When the court is directly faced with the question, its decision might
very well be influenced by the solvency or insolvency of the supplier who
actually applied the infringing mark. If he is insolvent, the court might
be more willing to grant a plaintiff the full extent of relief under section
35 as against the retailer, even though he acted innocently.
Thus the problems are posed. It will be interesting to see how they
will be answered when and if a court is directly confronted with them.
Francis P. Connors.
42. It could be that, notwithstanding the Lanham Act, the retail seller is negligent
in that he owes a duty to the registered owner of a trade mark not to sell goods
purchased elsewhere which have an infringing trade mark on them.
43. The court may feel in this situation that the registrant should recover his
damages and profits from the one who actually applied the infringing mark to the
goods.
44. U.S. CODE CONG. NEws 1274 (1946).
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